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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Larry S. Skerski filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
against his former employer Time W arner Cable Co., 
alleging discrimination on the basis of a disability in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 
U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. The District Court granted Time 
Warner's motion for summary judgment and Skerski 
appeals. 
 
I. 
 
At all times relevant to this action, appellee Time Warner 
and its predecessor in interest operated a television cable 
franchise in the Coraopolis/Moon Township ar ea of 
Western Pennsylvania. Time Warner's predecessor, New 
Channels,1 hired Skerski in 1982 to upgrade cable 
converters in customers' homes. Several months later , 
Skerski was trained and began working as a cable service 
technician to install and disconnect cable television service 
for customers. As part of his job as an installer technician, 
Skerski serviced cable wires at aerial cable plants (hereafter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Time Warner refers to this company as "New Channels" whereas 
Skerski refers to it as "Astro Cablevision" or "Newhouse Annex 
Corporation." We shall refer to it as"New Channels." 
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referred to as "overhead work") and underground plants 
(hereafter referred to as "underground work").2 Performing 
the overhead work required Skerski to climb ladders, poles, 
and towers, and work at heights. In his deposition 
testimony, Skerski first asserted that "ther e was more 
underground [work] than over head [work]," app. at 352, but 
he later agreed that approximately 50% of his job required 
climbing, app. at 41-42. The written description of Skerski's 
job prepared by New Channels included"repetitive . . . pole 
climbing . . . and ladder climbing" among the"Physical 
Tasks." App. at 143. 
 
In May 1993, more than 10 years after he began working 
as an installer technician at New Channels, Skerski began 
experiencing dizziness, nausea, and irregular heartbeats 
while working at heights. In June 1993, Skerski was 
examined by Dr. Stephen G. Brodsky and was diagnosed as 
having a panic and anxiety disorder associated with 
premature ventricular contractions of the heart. Dr. 
Brodsky referred Skerski to Dr . Stuart L. Steinberg, a 
psychologist, for his panic condition. Dr. Steinberg 
recommended that Skerski cease climbing ladders and 
poles, and otherwise working at heights. 
 
Upon learning of Dr. Steinberg's diagnosis, Skerski's 
supervisor at New Channels, David Kane, modified 
Skerski's schedule so as to permit him to continue working 
as an installer technician. Thus, New Channels limited 
Skerski's assignments to underground work. The 
assignments were distributed each day at Kane's direction. 
Skerski continued to perform under this"modified 
arrangement," app. at 361, after New Channels was 
acquired by Time Warner in March 1995, and until 
January 1997. 
 
Under Time Warner, Skerski's job effectively remained the 
same. Time Warner's written description of Skerski's 
position listed the nine essential functions as: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There are occasional refer ences in the briefs and in the Appendix to 
"ground work" as well, but there is no attempt to distinguish such work 
from "underground work." We assume there is no difference, but if there 
is, it is clear that neither form of work involves climbing. For our 
purposes, we will simply discuss "undergr ound work." 
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       1. Conducts CLI testing and repairs, checks amplifier 
       levels in the feeder system for signal quality, and 
       handles routine plant maintenance. 
 
       2. Performs FSM calibration and r epairs system 
       problems (i.e., power supplies, active and passive 
       devices and cable). 
 
       3. Responds to and completes subscriber technical 
       service calls. Repairs include, but are not limited 
       to: drop wiring, matching xformers, converter 
       replacement, and TV fine tuning. 
 
       4. Repairs and replaces strand, lashing, pole line 
       transfers and general construction. 
 
       5. Installs new trunk, feeder cables, and associated 
       hardware. 
 
       6. Installs and maintains subscriber contr ol and 
       distribution system for multi-subscriber systems. 
 
       7. Maintains and stocks necessary materials and 
       tools for company vehicle. 
 
       8. Records data on system equipment and 
       operation/services and accurately completes all 
       paperwork as assigned. 
 
       9. Recognizes, practices, and enforces safety rules 
       and procedures when performing technical tasks. 
 
App. at 145-146. Each essential function described aspects 
of that function. One of the four aspects under the fourth 
essential function was "[m]ay climb poles to perform line 
transfers." App. at 145. The position description also 
included "climbing" within the "Special Skills, Knowledges 
and Abilities" section. As in the New Channels' description, 
the "Physical Requirements" section included "[c]limbing on 
ladders, telephone poles, and/or towers." App. at 147. 
 
At some point in 1995, Kane resigned due to poor health 
and was temporarily replaced by Donna Gruseck before 
Time Warner hired Richar d Hanning in the fall of 1996 to 
serve as technical operations manager. In that position, 
Hanning was Skerski's immediate supervisor. In October 
1996, Hanning gave Skerski a below-standard per formance 
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review because of his inability to climb. T ime Warner 
concedes that otherwise "Skerski's perfor mance was 
superior." Br. of Appellee at 8. However, at that time 
Hanning told Skerski that Time War ner could not permit 
him to continue working on his modified no-climbing 
schedule. According to Skerski, this was thefirst time since 
the onset of his panic and anxiety disorder in 1993 that 
anyone at either New Channels or Time W arner had 
demanded that he climb. 
 
Skerski described the conversation in his deposition. He 
testified that he told Hanning that he could continue to 
climb "with an accommodation," and asked if he"could 
have a bucket truck," which he had used befor e 
successfully, even after his panic disorder was diagnosed. 
App. at 83. Hanning responded that Time W arner didn't 
have any bucket trucks to give him, but Skerski believed it 
did have an extra bucket truck, which he referr ed to as "an 
older one." App. at 84. Skerski said that he asked Hanning 
that he be permitted to continue with his underground 
work but that Hanning responded, " `Y ou need to be 100 
percent.' He said Time War ner will not accommodate me, 
nor do they have to." App. at 85. 
 
At about this time, Time Warner offered Skerski the 
opportunity to complete a 90-day training pr ogram to allow 
him to re-acquire the climbing skills necessary to continue 
in his job as a technician. In a perfor mance review memo 
dated October 28, 1996, Hanning wrote that"[f]ailure to 
successfully complete [the 90-day program] and the interim 
goals will lead to additional disciplinary action up to and 
including termination." App. at 156. 
 
Skerski attempted, but was unable to complete the 
training program. He repeatedly complained, "I can't be 
doing this" because of his anxiety disorder . App. at 388. Dr. 
Steinberg, who had continued to treat Skerski, sent a letter 
dated November 21, 1996 reinforcing his prior medical 
opinion that, inter alia, "[t]he fear of panic attacks is 
incapacitating and interferes with [Skerski's] work and his 
private life." App. at 150. Time War ner then stopped the 
training program without explanation. 
 
It was Time Warner's intention to terminate Skerski's 
employment as an installer technician in light of his 
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continued inability to climb. It did, however , offer him as an 
alternative to termination a newly-cr eated warehouse 
position that paid considerably less than the technician 
position -- $12.50 per hour in the warehouse compared to 
the $19.45 per hour he had received as a technician. This 
may have been in response to Skerski's letter dated 
November 24, 1996, expressing his inter est in a newly- 
created position in the warehouse, although Skerski made 
clear in that letter that he preferred to continue working in 
the same capacity as he had worked in the pr evious three 
years. At the end of January 1997, Skerski accepted the 
warehouse position but stated in his deposition that he did 
so "only under duress," as Time W arner "[was] threatening 
[him] with termination." App. at 92. 
 
Shortly after beginning the warehouse position in early 
February 1997, a position for which Skerski claims he 
"didn't have the skills," app. at 92, he injur ed his back 
while lifting and carrying heavy material. Skerski has not 
returned to work since then, having developed severe lower 
back pain. He has received workers' compensation benefits 
based on his salary as an installer technician. 
 
Skerski commenced this civil action under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act in February 1998, seeking to r ecover 
money damages from Time War ner and reinstatement to 
his "modified duty status" as an installer technician. App. 
at 13. The District Court granted Time W arner's motion for 
summary judgment on January 27, 2000.  See Skerski v. 
Time Warner Cable Co., No. 98-341 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 
2000). The court determined that there is a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether Skerski is "disabled" and 
acknowledged Time Warner's concession that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether he suf fered "an 
otherwise adverse employment decision" under the ADA. 
Nonetheless it granted summary judgment to T ime Warner 
because it found that climbing was an essential function of 
the installer technician's job that Skerski could not perform 
and that the transfer to a warehouse position was a 
reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, the District Court 
determined that Skerski failed to set forth sufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie case under the ADA. 
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Skerski timely filed a notice of appeal. The District Court 
exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Skerski's ADA 
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and we have appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate where"there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a 
court must draw all reasonable inferences from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party. See Battaglia v. McKendry, 233 F.3d 720, 
722 (3d Cir. 2000). The burden is on the moving party to 
demonstrate that the evidence creates no genuine issue of 
material fact. See Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, 
Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996). Once the moving 
party has met this initial burden, the non-moving party 
must present concrete evidence that supports each 
essential element of its claim. See id. A district court's grant 
of summary judgment is subject to plenary review. See 
Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co. , 124 F.3d 
508, 515 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers 
from discriminating based upon the known physical or 
mental impairments of "a qualified individual with a 
disability." 42 U.S.C. S 12112. To make out a prima facie 
case under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that s/he (1) 
has a "disability," (2) is a "qualified individual," and (3) has 
suffered an "adverse employment decision" as a result of 
that disability. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr ., 142 F.3d 138, 
142 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). The District Court found that 
there were disputed issues of material fact with regard to 
the first and third prongs of this test, but relied on the 
second prong for its judgment. The court deter mined that 
as a matter of law Skerski is not a "qualified individual" 
under the ADA, and therefore held that he had failed to set 
forth a prima facie case of discrimination that could survive 
Time Warner's motion for summary judgment. 
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Under the ADA, a "qualified individual" is one "who, with 
or without reasonable accommodation, can per form the 
essential functions of the employment position that such 
individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C.S 12111(8). To satisfy 
this requirement, a plaintiff mustfirst demonstrate that 
s/he "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and 
other job-related requirements of the employment position 
that such individual holds or desires." Deane, 142 F.3d at 
145. Second, a plaintiff must establish that s/he, "with or 
without reasonable accommodation, can per form the 
essential functions of the position held or sought." Id. There 
is no dispute as to the first part of this analysis as Time 
Warner readily concedes that Skerski was an experienced 
installer technician. Rather, the issues in the instant case 
revolve around the latter question. 
 
Turning our attention to this second question requires us 
to conduct another two-part inquiry. First, we must 
determine whether Skerski can perfor m the essential 
functions of his job without accommodation. If this is the 
case, we will consider him a "qualified individual," thereby 
satisfying the second part of a prima facie case under the 
ADA. If Skerski cannot perform the essential functions of 
his job as an installer technician without accommodation, 
we must then inquire whether he can per form those same 
functions with a reasonable accommodation. Again, if he 
can do so, he will be considered a "qualified individual" 
under the ADA. See id. at 146. If we determine that genuine 
issues of material fact exist as to whether Skerski is a 
"qualified individual" under the ADA, we must reverse the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment to T ime 
Warner and remand the case for trial. 
 
A. 
 
Climbing as an "Essential Function" 
 
Skerski first argues that the District Court erred in 
determining that climbing is an essential function of his job 
as an installer technician as a matter of law. He contends 
that, at the very least, there is a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether climbing is essential which should be 
reserved for a jury. 
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We look first to the relevant agency r egulations to 
determine whether climbing is an essential function of 
Skerski's job as an installer technician. A job's"essential 
functions" are defined in 29 C.F.R.S 1630.2(n)(1) as those 
that are "fundamental," not "mar ginal." The regulations list 
several factors for consideration in distinguishing the 
fundamental job functions from the marginal job functions, 
including: (1) whether the performance of the function is 
"the reason the position exists;" (2) whether there are a 
"limited number of employees available among whom the 
performance of that job function can be distributed;" and 
(3) whether the function is "highly specialized so that the 
incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise." 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(n)(2). The r egulations further set forth a 
non-exhaustive list of seven examples of evidence that are 
designed to assist a court in identifying the "essential 
functions" of a job. They include: 
 
       (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are 
       essential; 
 
       (ii) Written job descriptions prepar ed before 
       advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; 
 
       (iii) The amount of time spent on the job per forming 
       the function; 
 
       (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent 
       to perform the function; 
 
       (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; 
 
       (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the 
       jobs; and/or 
 
       (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in 
       similar jobs. 
 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(n)(3). 
 
As is apparent, "[w]hether a particular function is 
essential is a factual determination that must be made on 
a case by case basis." EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title 
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F .R. pt. 1630, 
App. 1630.2(n) (2000) [hereafter "EEOC Interpretive 
Guidance"]. It follows that none of the factors nor any of the 
evidentiary examples alone are necessarily dispositive. 
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See Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
 
In granting summary judgment, the District Court stated 
that "reasonable jurors could onlyfind that climbing is an 
essential element of the installer technician position." 
Skerski, slip op. at 7. Referring to the r egulations, the 
District Court found significant that Time W arner's own 
judgment and the written job descriptions issued by both 
Time Warner and New Channels suggested that climbing 
was an essential job requirement, and that Skerski himself 
admitted in his deposition that as an installer technician he 
spent a considerable portion of his time climbing. The court 
further dismissed Skerski's reliance on evidence that 
another co-worker spent most of his time working on 
underground work, explaining that "Skerski does not . . . 
introduce any evidence suggesting that this co-worker 
never climbs." Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
 
Looking to the three factors included in S 1630.2(n)(2), it 
is evident that two are not present in this case as installer 
technicians are not hired solely to climb or even because of 
their climbing expertise. See 29 C.F .R. S 1630.2(n)(2)(i) and 
(iii). On the other hand, the other factor supports the 
District Court's conclusion that climbing is an essential 
function of the job of installer technician. Ther e is evidence 
to suggest that Time Warner employs a limited number of 
installer technicians in Skerski's work area-- only 7 or 8, 
according to Skerski -- and that this small number 
hampers Time Warner's ability to allow certain technicians 
to avoid climbing. The significance of this factor is pointed 
out in the Interpretive Guidance to S 1630.2(n), which 
explains, "if an employer has a relatively small number of 
available employees for the volume of work to be per formed, 
it may be necessary that each employee perfor m a 
multitude of different functions. Ther efore, the performance 
of those functions by each employee becomes mor e critical 
and the options for reorganizing the work become more 
limited." EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F .R. pt. 1630, 
App. 1630.2(n). 
 
But this is only one of the three factors. Mor eover, 
consideration of the seven evidentiary examples included in 
S 1630.2(n)(3) suggests caution against any pr emature 
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determination on essential functions as at least some of 
them lean in Skerski's favor. Of course, as r equired by 
S 1630.2(n)(3)(i), we owe some deference to Time Warner 
and its own judgment that climbing is essential to the 
installer technician position. And the written job 
descriptions, as the District Court noted, "clearly identify 
climbing as a job requirement." Skerksi, slip op. at 7. 
However, describing climbing as a requir ement is not 
necessarily the same as denominating climbing as an 
essential function. In fact, the job descriptions pr epared by 
both New Channels and Time Warner list various duties 
and responsibilities under the heading "Essential 
Functions," but neither identifies climbing as"essential."3 
Instead, New Channels includes climbing under the 
heading "Physical Tasks," app. at 143, and Time Warner 
includes climbing under "Special Skills[ ]" and "Physical 
Requirements," app. at 147. Although "may climb poles" is 
listed as an aspect of one of Time War ner's essential 
functions, the failure of both job descriptions to list 
"climbing" under the heading "Essential Functions" 
suggests one could view climbing as a useful skill or 
method to perform the essential functions of the job but 
that it is not itself an essential function of the installer 
technician position. 
 
The distinction was made by Representative Fish when 
he introduced amendments to the bill that became the ADA 
relating to the definition of a "qualified individual" and the 
reasonable accommodation requirement and which were 
incorporated into the ADA. In his comments, he stated: 
 
       [T]he essential function requirement focuses on the 
       desired result rather than the means of accomplishing 
       it. For example, in one case under the Rehabilitation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The nine essential functions set forth in T ime Warner's job 
description 
are set forth in the text. New Channels listed the following as "Essential 
Job Functions" in its written description of Skerski's installer 
technician 
position: (1) "Must possess a valid driver's license, have ability to 
drive 
company vehicles and have a good driving recor d;" (2) "Public relations 
skills to the extent that they are needed for verbal and written 
communication of both technical and non-technical information to 
customers and fellow employees;" and (3) "Must have mechanical ability 
to use small tools." App. at 143. 
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       Act, the employer required each employee to be able to 
       perform the job with both arms. Prewitt v. U.S. Postal 
       Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff was 
       unable to do this because his disability resulted in 
       limited mobility in his left arm. The court found that 
       the essential function of the job was the ability to lift 
       and carry mail which the employee had proven that he 
       could do, not the ability to use both arms. Moreover, 
       the court found that the employer was requir ed to 
       adapt the work environment to determine whether the 
       employee with the disability could perfor m the essential 
       requirements of the job with reasonable adaptations. 
 
       Likewise, in a job requiring the use of a computer, 
       the essential function is the ability to access, input, 
       and retrieve information from the computer. It is not 
       essential that the person be able to use the keyboar d or 
       visually read the computer screen, if the provision of 
       adaptive equipment or software would enable the 
       person with the disability -- for example, impair ed 
       vision or limited hand control -- to contr ol the 
       computer and access the information. The r elevant 
       question would be whether the acquisition of the 
       equipment would be a reasonable accommodation, 
       given the factors to be considered in making that 
       determination. 
 
136 Cong. Rec. 11,451 (1990). 
 
Among the facts and circumstances relevant to each case 
is, of course, the employee's actual experience as well as 
that of other employees. See 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(n)(3)(iv), (vi) 
and (vii). It is undisputed that from the time Skerski began 
as an installer technician in 1982 until the time he was 
diagnosed with his panic disorder in 1993, a significant 
portion of his job responsibilities requir ed climbing. There 
is a basis to find that Skerski spent appr oximately 50% of 
his time before his 1993 diagnosis perfor ming work that 
required climbing. However, for the three and a half years 
after his diagnosis in which he continued to work as an 
installer technician, Skerski performed virtually no 
overhead work at all. He only did so when he was "trying to 
see if [he] could do it." App. at 375. As we noted above, 
Time Warner conceded that Skerski continuously received 
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high ratings for his performance during this time. Skerski 
testified at his deposition that there always was enough 
underground work to do, that he always worked 40-hour 
weeks and even worked enough to earn a couple thousand 
dollars per year in overtime, and that he had never 
experienced problems at work because of his panic disorder 
until Hanning became his supervisor in the fall of 1996. 
 
For further support, Skerski points to the experience of 
one of his co-workers, Bill Bajnowski, who allegedly worked 
almost exclusively on underground assignments. We are 
unable to give that experience much weight because 
Bajnowski, unlike Skerski, was never put on "modified" 
duty, app. at 369, and Skerski admitted that no other 
installer technicians had ever been restricted from overhead 
work like he was. 
 
Skerski argues that his own experience exemplifies that 
no negative consequences resulted from his failure to 
perform the climbing function of his job, which is another 
of the illustrations listed in the regulations. See 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). However, ther e is support in the record 
for Time Warner's contention that Skerski's inability to 
climb caused it considerable administrative difficulties. 
Approximately 75%, or 170 miles, of Time Warner's cable 
system in the relevant area consists of overhead aerial 
cable, which requires installer technicians to climb to 
service the cables. Hanning testified that Skerski's inability 
to climb "made the routing process extr emely 
cumbersome," app. at 121, because the assignment process 
had to be done by hand instead of computer. He also 
claimed that Skerski's inability to climb necessitated the 
hiring of outside contract labor to meet demand, and that 
Skerski was not always as busy as he should have been 
due to his restricted work schedule. In an affidavit, Michael 
Flynn, Time Warner's technical operations manager in 
Skerski's area since January 1998, stated that the need to 
climb on a particular assignment may not be deter mined 
until the technician actually arrives at the location of the 
service call and it is therefore often difficult to predict 
whether overhead or underground work will be needed on 
a given day. 
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But Time Warner's evidence does not stand undisputed. 
Skerski testified that he always knew in advance whether 
an assignment would require climbing, and that his former 
supervisors Kane and Gruseck each had doled out 
assignments by hand without difficulty. Mor eover, at oral 
argument before us, Time War ner's counsel acknowledged 
that he knows of no instance in which Skerski went out on 
assignment, only to have to return because the assignment 
required climbing. And Skerski claimed in his letter of 
November 24, 1996 that his "fellow employees, both field 
and office, have expressed their support in the companies 
[sic] accommodation with my current position." App. at 
158. 
 
In support of its argument that climbing is an essential 
function of Skerski's job, Time War ner relies on two district 
court decisions from outside this circuit. Of course, neither 
binds us but inasmuch as the facts presented ar e not 
dissimilar to those presented here, we consider them. In 
Lodderhose v. Viacom Cable, Inc., No. C96-4282 SI, 1998 
WL 57025 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1998), a cable installer 
technician suffering from multiple scler osis sought to 
continue in his job even after his doctors opined that he 
could not safely work at heights because of his decr eased 
coordination and balance problems. Although the cable 
company transferred him to another position in the 
company as a field sales representative, albeit with smaller 
income, and offered alternate accommodations, Lodderhose 
sued, alleging discrimination under the ADA. 
 
The court stated that Lodderhose did not r eally dispute 
whether climbing was an essential function of his job. See 
id. at *6. The unpublished opinion thus focused on whether 
the employer could have reasonably accommodated the 
plaintiff by reassigning him or r estructuring his job. In 
contrast, Skerski has set forth evidence that places into 
dispute whether climbing was an essential function of his 
job. Specifically, Skerski argues that he did work for more 
than three years in his capacity as installer technician 
without climbing. Therefore, this case is distinguishable 
from Lodderhose. 
 
Time Warner responds that the fact that Skerski was 
assigned underground work for thr ee years following his 
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1993 diagnosis is not relevant to this court's determination 
of what functions are essential to the job of installer 
technician. It notes that in Allen v. Geor gia Power Co., 980 
F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ga. 1997), the court held that certain 
physical movements that an electrician could not per form 
because of a back injury were "essential functions of the 
position of electrician" even though the electrician had 
continued in his job for 30 months after the injury in a 
"light duty" capacity in which he perfor med none of those 
movements. Id. at 476. But the plaintif f in Allen based his 
argument that climbing was not an essential function of his 
job on the ground that the essential functions of his job 
changed when his employer switched from a supervisor- 
directed job-assignment system to one in which each 
employee was self-directed. The plaintif f readily admitted 
that climbing had been an essential function of his job, but 
argued that after the switch, "the only essential function of 
the position of electrician was to keep himself busy." Id. In 
contrast, in the case before us there was no change in the 
manner in which job assignments were distributed; rather, 
Skerski argues that climbing was never an essential 
function of his job. 
 
Skerski emphasizes that the Allen plaintif f could not 
perform the majority of the assignments generally given to 
electricians whereas he can perfor m the majority of the 
functions of an installer technician. These ar e jury 
arguments. Skerski's ability to perfor m as an installer 
technician for more than three years without climbing 
might lead a reasonable juror to infer that Skerski's 
inability to climb had no adverse consequences for his 
employer, a factor that is relevant to determining what is an 
essential function. See 29 C.F.R.S 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). In light 
of the conflicting deposition testimonies of fered by Skerski 
and Hanning, it is unclear what effect Skerksi's inability to 
climb had on the servicing of Time War ner's cable system 
in the Coraopolis area. 
 
We do not suggest that the District Court her e had no 
basis for its conclusion that climbing is an essential 
function of Skerski's position as installer technician or even 
that, if we were the triers of fact, we would not so hold. But 
upon reviewing the three factors listed in 29 C.F.R. 
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S 1630.2(n)(2) and the seven evidentiary examples provided 
by 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(n)(3), it is apparent that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists as to whether climbing is an 
essential function of the job of installer technician at Time 
Warner. Although the employer's judgment and the written 
job descriptions may warrant some deference, Skerski has 
put forth considerable evidence that contradicts T ime 
Warner's assertions, particularly the uncontradicted fact 
that following his 1993 diagnosis he worked for mor e than 
three years as an installer technician for T ime Warner 
without ever having to perform over head work. Moreover, 
certain evidence suggests that during these thr ee-plus 
years Skerski received repeated commendations for his 
work and never received any complaints fr om supervisors 
or co-workers, that is until Hanning became his immediate 
supervisor in the fall of 1996. 
 
Skerski's situation is not dissimilar from that of Deane, 
a nurse who was unable to do heavy lifting without 
assistance. The hospital for which she worked contended 
that lifting was an essential function of her position, and 
that because she was unable to lift she was not a"qualified 
individual" under the ADA. Deane conceded that lifting was 
part of a nurse's duties but claimed that the heavy lifting 
she was restricted from doing was not an essential function 
of a nurse. In light of the evidence produced by both, this 
court en banc found that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact that must be decided by a jury. See Deane, 
142 F.3d at 148. We therefor e conclude that the District 
Court incorrectly decided that "reasonable jurors could only 
find that climbing is an essential element of the installer 
technician position." Skerski, slip op. at 7. Because a 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether climbing 
is an essential function, and therefore whether Skerksi is a 
"qualified individual" under the ADA, this case must be 
remanded for trial. 
 
B. 
 
"Reasonable Accommodation" 
 
Skerski argues that even if climbing is an essential 
function, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether 
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he can, with a "reasonable accommodation," perform the 
job as an installer technician, and that summary judgment 
was therefore improper. 
 
As explained earlier, a disabled employee may establish a 
prima facie case under the ADA if s/he shows that s/he 
can perform the essential functions of the job with 
reasonable accommodation and that the employer refused 
to make such an accommodation. According to the ADA, a 
"reasonable accommodation" includes: 
 
       job restructuring, part-time or modified work 
       schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
       acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
       appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
       examinations, training materials or policies, the 
       provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
       similar accommodations for individuals with 
       disabilities. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12111(9)(B). The relevant r egulations define 
reasonable accommodations as "[m]odifications or 
adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or 
circumstances under which the position held or desired is 
customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual 
with a disability to perform the essential functions of that 
position." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). 
 
In Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Southeastern Pa., 168 
F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999), this court established that, "[o]n 
the issue of reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff bears 
only the burden of identifying an accommodation, the costs 
of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits." Id. at 
670 (quotation omitted); see also Borkowski v. V alley 
Central Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Summary judgment may be granted for a defendant only 
"in cases in which the plaintiff's pr oposal is either clearly 
ineffective or outlandishly costly." Walton, 168 F.3d at 670 
(quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
If the plaintiff satisfies his or her bur den, the defendant 
then has the burden to demonstrate that the pr oposed 
accommodation creates an "undue hardship" for it. See id.; 
42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA defines"undue 
hardship" as "an action requiring significant difficulty or 
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expense, when considered in light of [a series of factors]." 
42 U.S.C. S 12111(10)(A). Among the factors to be 
considered are "the effect on expenses and resources, or 
the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the 
operation of the facility." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(10)(B). 
 
The District Court found that Time War ner fulfilled its 
responsibilities under the ADA by reassigning Skerski to a 
warehouse position. The District Court noted that 
regulations implementing the ADA list "r eassignment to a 
vacant position" as a possible reasonable accommodation. 
See Skerski, slip op. at 9 (quoting 29 C.F .R. 
S 1630.2(o)(2)(ii)). The District Court found significant the 
fact that Skerski had previously requested a transfer to the 
warehouse. Skerski argues that his prior request for such 
a transfer does not prove that it qualifies as a reasonable 
accommodation. He testified in his deposition that he had 
requested the warehouse transfer "only under duress" 
because he was afraid he was going to lose his job. App. at 
398. Skerski stated, "I'll take anything at that point, but I 
wanted my tech job." App. at 398. Therefor e, no inference 
that the transfer was reasonable can be drawn from 
Skerski's request. 
 
The District Court apparently was also awar e that a 
transfer is not a reasonable accommodation if the employee 
is not qualified for the new position, see Mengine v. 
Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir . 1997) (discussing the 
Rehabilitation Act, the analysis of which is equivalent to 
that of the ADA), as the court noted that Skerski had failed 
to argue that he lacked the training, education, or skills 
required for the warehouse position. However, there is 
evidence in the record that suggests that Skerski was not 
qualified for the warehouse position. In his deposition, 
Skerski stated that he lacked the necessary computer and 
inventory skills, and that the warehouse position was "a 
more physically demanding job." App. at 398. Time Warner 
has not contested these assertions. In light of all these 
outstanding factual questions, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether reassignment to the 
considerably lower-paying warehouse position ($12.50 per 
hour compared with the installer technician position paying 
$19.45 per hour) was a reasonable accommodation that 
satisfied the ADA. 
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Of even more significance is the fact that the EEOC's 
commentary to the regulations makes clear that 
 661<!>reassignment "should be considered only when 
 
accommodation within the individual's curr ent position 
would pose an undue hardship." EEOC Interpr etive 
Guidance, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(o) (emphasis 
added). The commentary continues: "[a]n employer may 
reassign an individual to a lower graded position if there 
are no accommodations that would enable the employee to 
remain in the current position and ther e are no vacant 
equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified 
with or without reasonable accommodation." Id. In the 
instant case, it is not at all clear that a r easonable 
accommodation within Skerski's installer technician 
position was not possible. 
 
Time Warner's defense in this case has been, in essence, 
that it would have been "inconvenient" for it to make the 
adjustments needed to retain Skerski in the position that 
he previously had. However, the ADA was enacted to 
compel employers to look deeper and more cr eatively into 
the various possibilities suggested by an employee with a 
disability. As is evident from the section on r easonable 
accommodation in the House Report to the Act, to which 
the Senate receded, it is only when the accommodation 
suggested would constitute an undue hardship that the 
employer can justify failure to accommodate in that 
manner. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), at 67-68 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 349-50. 
 
Skerski contends that Time Warner should have 
permitted him to use a bucket truck to work at heights as 
an installer technician, which would have enabled him to 
avoid climbing.4 Skerski testified in his deposition that, in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Skerski also argued in the District Court that Time Warner should 
have permitted him to continue to work under the modified schedule in 
which he only performed undergr ound work. The District Court 
determined that this proposal would not be a reasonable 
accommodation. Because Skerski has not challenged this finding on 
appeal, we need not review the District Court's determination on this 
matter. We note, however, that while the fact that Time Warner 
previously permitted Skerski to work without performing overhead work 
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response to Hanning's demand in the fall of 1996 that he 
resume the climbing functions of his installer technician 
position, he offered to use a bucket truck instead, and that 
this bucket truck would enable him to perfor m all of the 
required overhead work. Although T ime Warner rejected 
this proposition, Skerski further testified that it was his 
understanding that Time Warner had a bucket truck 
available for use at the time. Time War ner does not contest 
Skerski's claim that he requested the use of a bucket truck 
before being reassigned. 
 
At oral argument, Time War ner's counsel asserted that 
providing Skerski with a bucket truck would have been 
"clearly ineffective" in light of a letter from Skerski's 
treating physician, Dr. Steinber g, in which Dr. Steinberg 
stated that Skerski's panic disorder "pr events him from 
climbing ladders more than a single extension, working in 
a bucket truck over that height, working on the r oof of his 
home, . . . or approaching any height situation that 
increases his premature ventricular contractions or fear of 
having a panic attack. The fear emanates from a panic 
attack resulting in loss of balance and falling to the 
ground." App. at 150. Time War ner points out that in 
Lodderhose the district court accepted the defendant's 
similar argument that a proposed accommodation was 
unreasonable because the proposal r equired the plaintiff to 
undertake activity that his own doctors had deemed 
"unsafe." 1998 WL 57025, at *7. 
 
Notwithstanding the district court's analysis in 
Lodderhose, we find present her e a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether providing Skerksi with a bucket 
truck would have been a reasonable accommodation. There 
does not appear to have been much, if any, attention 
devoted to this issue in the proceedings befor e the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
for three years is relevant to whether his working at heights was 
essential to his job, it is not relevant to whether his disability can be 
accommodated. This is because employers are not required to 
accommodate an employee by removing an essential function or 
restructuring a job so as to avoid it, but, rather, they are to provide an 
accommodation so as to enable the employee to per form such a function. 
See EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F .R. pt. 1630, App. 1630.2(o). 
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Court. The court did not refer to a bucket truck in its 
opinion, and the only references in the r ecord to the 
possibility of its use were Skerski's testimony in his 
deposition that he proposed this alternative to Time Warner 
and that Time Warner owned bucket trucks at the time, 
and the reference in Dr. Steinber g's letter to Skerski's 
inability to work in a variety of jobs at heights. T ime 
Warner has not argued befor e us that bucket trucks were 
unavailable for Skerski's use or that providing Skerski with 
a bucket truck would have posed an undue har dship on it. 
In fact, Time Warner conceded at oral argument that there 
were three or four bucket trucks in its system, but of 
course it is a factual issue whether one could have been 
put at Skerski's disposal. 
 
Time Warner's reliance on the letter from Dr. Steinberg 
may ultimately carry the day. However, as Skerski's counsel 
pointed out, Dr. Steinberg has never been questioned, 
much less cross-examined, as to whether a bucket truck 
was a viable alternative, or the circumstances under which 
Skerski might have been able to use a bucket truck. The 
weight to be given to Dr. Steinberg's letter is a question that 
should ultimately be decided by a jury. 
 
If the jury were to find that the bucket truck was a 
reasonable accommodation, the reassignment to the 
warehouse position did not satisfy the r equirements of the 
ADA. See  EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 
App. 1630.2(o). We therefore find that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Time W arner provided 
Skerski with a reasonable accommodation, ther eby making 
summary judgment inappropriate. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will r everse the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment to T ime Warner 
on Skerski's claim under the ADA. We believe there are 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether climbing is an 
"essential function" of Skerski's job as an installer 
technician, and, if it is, whether Time W arner provided 
Skerski with a "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA. 
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Accordingly, we will remand for further pr oceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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